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Abstract
Collaborative Filtering (CF) models lie at the core of most rec-
ommendation systems due to their state-of-the-art accuracy. They
are commonly adopted in e-commerce and online services for their
impact on sales volume and/or diversity, and their impact on com-
panies’ outcome. However, CF models are only as good as the inter-
action data they work with. As these models rely on outside sources
of information, counterfeit data such as user ratings or reviews can
be injected by attackers to manipulate the underlying data and
alter the impact of resulting recommendations, thus implement-
ing a so-called shilling attack. While previous works have focused
on evaluating shilling attack strategies from a global perspective
paying particular attention to the effect of the size of attacks and
attacker’s knowledge, in this work we explore the effectiveness of
shilling attacks under novel aspects. First, we investigate the effect
of attack strategies crafted on a target user in order to push the rec-
ommendation of a low-ranking item to a higher position, referred to
as user-item attack. Second, we evaluate the effectiveness of attacks
in altering the impact of different CF models by contemplating the
class of the target user, from the perspective of the richness of her
profile (i.e., slightly-active v.s. highly-active user). Finally, similar to
previous work we contemplate the size of attack (i.e., the amount
of fake profiles injected) in examining their success.
The results of experiments on two widely used datasets in busi-
ness and movie domains, namely Yelp and MovieLens, suggest that
highly-active and slightly-active users exhibit contrasting behaviors
in datasets with different characteristics.
1 Introduction and Related Work
Collaborative filtering (CF) models are a crucial component in
many real-world recommendation services due to their state-of-the-
art accuracy. Considering their widespread popularity and adoption
in the industry, the output of these models can impact many de-
cision qualities in different application scenarios [3, 16, 28]. The
open nature of CF models, which rely on user-specified judgments
(e.g., ratings or reviews) to build user profiles and compute recom-
mendation, can be used in the hand of adversaries to manipulate
the underlying data and affect the impact of recommendation, a
phenomenon commonly referred to as shilling attacks [11, 19]. The
attacker maymanipulate the recommender for positive motivations,
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like outcomes improvement, or malicious, like reducing the user’s
loyalty to a competitor.
In this direction, first works [15, 19, 24] focused on different
profile injection strategies by analyzing and classifying them on
the required effort and amount of attacker’s knowledge to craft
successful attacks. These works have been followed by multiple
studies on the evaluation of the robustness [4, 7, 22] of different CF
models and detection strategies [8, 18, 29]. The robustness analysis
in surveys [11, 21] shows that Item-kNN is more robust than User-
kNN and model-based CF are generally more resistant to shilling
attacks than conventional nearest neighbor-based algorithms.
One common characteristic of the previous literature on shilling
attacks on CF-RS is their focus on assessing the global impact of
shilling attacks on different CF models by examining the success of
attacks from the perspective of attacker’s knowledge and the size of
attack (i.e. the number of shilling profiles) [11]. In the present work
instead, we investigate the effectiveness of an attack on a target-
item of a target-user, namely user-item attack, with a novel point of
attention focused on influence of the attack on the classes of attacked
users in particular highly-active (HA) user and slightly-active (SA)
user.
The application scenario for class-based study of attacks on RS
may span in different domains. As an example, a restaurant owner
may wish to diminish the trust on a target user of a competitor
by pushing a low-ranked product for the specific user. The same
argument can be made for new users. An attacker may be interested
in pushing or nuking, particular products with the objective of
modifying the impact of a recommender system in order to affect
future interactions of the new user.
The leading reserach questions of this work are then:
• RQ1: From a global perspective, what is the impact of user-
item attack on classes of users such as slightly-active and
highly-active users?
– Could attacks be tailored to have a higher impact on a
particular class of users?
– Which factors play a role on the impact of such an attack?
• RQ2: From a local perspective, how do CF recommendation
model work differently under user-item attacks by looking
to user-classes?
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
presents the evaluation protocol and datasets description we used
in our experimental evaluation. Section 3 reports on the results
and their discussion. Section 4 concludes the paper and introduces
future perspectives.
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2 User-Item attack modeling and evaluation
In this section, we discuss our evaluation protocol for a user-item
attack modeling and the corresponding evaluation setup.
2.1 Evaluation Protocol
In order to test the effects of a user-item attack on attacked
user classes, an extensive set of experiments has been carried out
with respect to three dimensions: (i) the attack strategy (type and
quantity of injected profiles), (ii) core CF recommendation model
and (iii) the user classes. The experimental evaluation has been
executed on two well-known datasets, MovieLens-1M (ML-1M) and
Yelp (described in Section 2.2).
2.1.1 Attack Strategies.We have implemented two attack strate-
gies to craft shilling profiles (SP) in order to model different level
of attacker’s capability. Given a user profile P(u) = {ri1 , . . . , rin }
(consisting of a set of items rated by user u), we consider the items
in P(u) in the form of: selected items (IS ), filler items (IF ), target
item (IT ) previously identified in [6], with |IS | + |IF | + |IT | = |P(u)|.
The items in the set IF are selected randomly in order to obstruct
detection of an SP while the only element in IT is the item that the
attacker wants to push, or nuke. Here we focus on two strategies
to build IS , which lies at the core of a shilling profile generation.
The number of items in a shilling profile is close to the mean value
of the number of rating in the dataset. We execute two types of
attacks:
• User-and-Model aware attack (UMA) assumes a partial
knowledge of some victim preferences. The attacker creates
a new profile, called seed profile, on the system with these
preferences and uses the recommendation systems to receive
recommendations. The recommendations are then used to
fill IS with high ratings. This type of attack is inspired by the
probe attack [2, 6, 11]. In the probe attack, the seed profile is
created by the adversary and the recommendations gener-
ated by the recommender system are used to learn related
items and their ratings in order to built up shilling profiles
very similar to existing users in the system. These items
constitute the 50% of each shilling profile.
• User-Neighbor aware attack (UNA) assumes that the at-
tacker knows some users similar to the victim. We employ
this attack by evaluating the k-nearest neighbor users of each
victim1 and selecting the most rated items in the neighbor
in order to fill IS . This attack is a modified version of the
bandwagon or popular attack [25]. While the bandwagon at-
tack sets high ratings on the popular items of the system; the
proposed attack sets high ratings on the popular items inside
the victim’s neighborhood in order in order to inject profiles
capable to influence more the victim-s recommendations.
We executed experiments with different size of injected profiles,
which are classified in small-size attacks by averaging results of
attacks with 2, 10, 20, 50 shilling profiles and large-size attacks by
averaging attacks with 200 and 500 injected profiles.
1experiment setting: k = 50, similarity metric = cosine similarity.
2.1.2 CF Models. In our evaluation, we compared the vulnerabil-
ity/robustness of the following CF models:
User-kNN [5]: user-based k-nearest-neighbor (kNN) method. In
our experiments, we set the number of neighbors k to 20 [19].
Item-kNN [27]: item-based kNN method. Also in this case, the
number of neighbors k has been set equal to 20.
BPR-SLIM [23]: Sparse LInear Method (SLIM) is an item-item
model that models the estimation of unknown user-item rating
as a regression problem. It learns a sparse aggregation coefficient
matrix from aggregated users’ preferences. This model allows the
system to capture correlations between items. BPR-SLIM uses the
BPR optimization criterion.2
BPR-MF [26]: This method uses matrix factorization (MF) as its un-
derlying core predictor and optimizes it with Bayesian Personalized
Ranking (BPR) objective function.
These CF models stand for state-of-the-art models for the item
recommendation task, each using a different prediction concept,
allowing us to study the impact of different attack strategies from
multiple viewpoints.
2.1.3 User Classes. Given that CF models only rely on user prefer-
ence scores (i.e., ratings) to compute recommendation, we hypoth-
esize that it is relevant to investigate the impact of different attack
strategies with respect to the victim user’s level of activity, i.e. the
richness of her profile, calculated on the basis of the number of
ratings available in her profile. To this aim, we define two classes
of users:
• Highly-active (HA) users are defined as users who have
a number of ratings greater than the second quartile of the
number of ratings for each user in the dataset.
• Slightly-active (SA) users are defined as users who have
a number of ratings lower than the second quartile.
2.1.4 Evaluation Metric. Several metrics have already been pro-
posed to evaluate malicious attacks. For example, [24] proposes the
prediction shift (PS) which estimates the success of an attack by
measuring the prediction difference before and after the attack [30].
It has been identified that a strong PS does not necessarily implies
an effective attack result [20]. From the perspective of the attacker,
the ideal goal in a push attack is to increase the chance of a de-
sired item being recommended after the attack than before. We
use a modified version of Hit-Ratio [17] to measure the fraction of
successful attacks on a set of different user-item pairs.
Definition 1. Let u be the user under attack and i be the targeted
item that the attacker wants to push/appear in the top-k recommenda-
tions of u. Let topku be the top-k recommendations of u. Let ϕ(i, topku )
be the function to evaluate the effectiveness on an attack on (u, i).
If i is pushed in the top-k then ϕ(i, topku ) = 1 (successful attack),
otherwise ϕ(i, topku ) = 0 (unsuccessful attack). Let S be the set of
(u, i) user-item pairs under attack. HR@k is defined as the fraction
of successful attacks on each (u, i) ∈ S .
HR@k =
∑
(u,i)∈S ϕ(i, topku )
|S | (1)
2The computation of the CF comparative models has been done with the publicly
available software library MyMediaLite http://www.mymedialite.net/. We used default
parameters for both BPR-MF and BPR-SLIM.
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where |S | is the number of (u, i) pairs over which HR@k is measured.
2.2 Data Descriptions
We conducted experiments on two well-known datasets, Movie-
Lens 1M [12] and Yelp [13, 14]. The datasets represent different item
recommendation scenarios for movie and business domains and
have data densities which are approximately 40 times different from
each other. Table 1 summarizes the statistics of the two datasets
(after pre-processing).
Table 1: Characteristics of the dataset used in the offline experi-
ment: |U | is the number of users, |I | the number of items, |R | the
number of ratings
Dataset |U| |I| |R| |R ||I | · |U | × 100
ML-1M 6040 3706 1000209 4.468%
Yelp 5135 5163 24809 0.093%
MovieLens-1M: We used a million-sized version of the dataset
ML-1M, which contain 1M ratings of users for items (movies). We
used the original ML-1M dataset for the experiments without any
filtering.
Yelp: This dataset contains ratings of users on businesses. We used
the pre-processed version of the dataset provided by [13, 14] with
731K ratings of 25K users for 25K businesses. Given the large size
of users and items from which item-item or user-similarities have
to be computed, similar to [1] we extracted a random sample of
5K users and 5K items in order to speed up the experiments. The
resulted dataset contains 24.8K ratings with data density (0.110%),
which is comparable with the one before filtering (0.093%).
3 Results and Discussion
In order to validate the empirical impact of the under study attack
types on different classes of users, an extensive set of experiments
has been carried out with respect to the dimensions introduced in
Section 2.1. The final results are presented in Table 2 and discussed
from the following viewpoints:
• A global analysis of the impact of attacks on user classes (cf.
Section 3.1)
• A fine-grained analysis of the impact of attacks on user
classes by looking into the CF models and attack types. (cf.
Section 3.2)
We present each of these analysis viewpoints in the following sub-
sections.
3.1 Global impact of attacks on user classes
The goal of this analysis is to answer the first research question
related to the global assessment on the effectiveness of user-item
attack with respect to the identified users classes. We use the term
global here, since in this analysis we would like to free our attention
from the impact of attacks on CF models, attack quality (type)
and/or quantity as they have been largely addressed in previous
works [11, 21, 22]. Instead, we examine the impact of attacks on
the dimension of user classes by looking into the aggregate mean
values computed across CF models on the two datasets we adopted
in our experimental evaluation.
A general observation for the results in Table 2 is that larger-size
attacks reach higher level of effectiveness on both classes of users
(highly-active and slightly-active) in comparison with smaller-size
attacks. For example, on the Yelp dataset, the average HR@10 for
UNA attack on highly-active users (across CF models) is 0.256 for
small-size attacks, while it is 0.800 for large-size attacks, a difference
of approximately three times. The same pattern of results is obtained
in other experimental cases. These results are in line with those
presented in previous works [21, 22].
Our objective here is to study the impact of different attack
strategies on user classes. For this purpose, we define the variable
r = HRHAHRSA and refer to it as user-class attack impact —i.e., the
impact of an attack on highly-active users in comparison with
slightly-active users. Different values for r are interpreted as in the
following:
• r = 1: the attack has an equal impact on highly-active and
slightly-active users.
• r > 1: the attack has an unequal impact on highly-active w.r.t
slightly-active users. The impact of attack on highly-active
users is relatively higher in comparison with slightly-active
users.3
• r < 1: the attack has an unequal impact on highly-active v.s.
slightly-active users. The impact of attack on slightly-active
users is relatively higher in comparison with highly-active
users.
It is obvious that the larger r deviates from the center point 1, the
larger is the attack success in differentiating highly-active with
respect to slightly-active users in one of the above-mentioned di-
rections (r < 1 or r > 1). Before starting a deeper analysis of the
results we highlight that the most interesting values are in the
left portion of Table 2 (small-size attacks), because when the size
of attack is larger the attack reaches the maximum effectiveness,
HR = 1, independently of user classes.
By looking at the results for each attack size in Table 2, we can
see that the average user-class impact r¯ has a value higher than 1 for
the Yelp dataset (r¯ > 1), while a value lower than 1 for the ML-1M
dataset (r¯ < 1). These results show that both attack types have an
unequal impact on slightly-active vs highly-active users as r , 1.
However, the class of users they have a larger impact on remains
largely different and contrasting in the two datasets.
As an example, in Yelp and for UMA, one can note that for small-
size attack r¯ = 2.393 and for large-size attack r¯ = 1.832, while
the corresponding values on ML-1M are r¯ = 0.658 and r¯ = 0.909,
respectively. This means that the impact of attacks on user classes is
higher on highly-active users on the Yelp dataset (r¯>1), differently
from ML-1M (r¯<1).
We conjecture that the above contrasting behaviors are directly
linked with the characteristics of the datasets such as their sparsity.
As shown in Table 1, Yelp dataset is approximately 40 times sparser
than ML-1M and we consider this difference as the main/possible
cause of the contrasting outcomes in tested datasets. We try to
provide a possible explanation here. In the more sparse dataset (i.e.,
the Yelp dataset), users with a small number of ratings (slightly-
active users) aremore immune to attacks because they have a smaller
3This is equal to say, slightly-active users are relatively more immune to the attack
w.r.t. highly-active users.
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Table 2: HR@10 for small-size and large-size attacks with respect to the class of user, slightly-active and highly-active, and the CF model. The
user-class impact r is the ratio of HRHA value to HRSA . (Abbreviations: HA→ Highly Active, SA→Slightly Active)
Small-size attacks Large-size attacks
Dataset CF/Attack U-kNN I-kNN BPRSLIM
BPR
MF mean U-kNN I-kNN
BPR
SLIM
BPR
MF mean
overall
mean
Yelp
UMA
SA 0.750 0.067 0.225 0.108 0.288 0.967 0.184 0.500 0.533 0.546 0.417
HA 0.800 0.350 0.492 0.117 0.440 1.000 0.667 0.784 0.584 0.758 0.599
r 1.067 5.243 2.184 1.079 2.393 1.034 3.632 1.567 1.095 1.832 2.113
UNA
SA 0.850 0.625 0.792 0.400 0.667 1.000 0.834 1.000 1.000 0.958 0.813
HA 0.875 0.742 0.850 0.433 0.725 1.000 0.850 1.000 1.000 0.963 0.844
r 1.029 1.186 1.074 1.082 1.093 1.000 1.020 1.000 1.000 1.005 1.049
ML-1M
UMA
SA 0.302 0.155 0.267 0.121 0.211 0.897 0.086 0.586 0.328 0.474 0.343
HA 0.092 0.108 0.159 0.125 0.121 0.383 0.150 0.350 0.284 0.292 0.206
r 0.303 0.698 0.593 1.037 0.658 0.427 1.744 0.597 0.866 0.909 0.783
UNA
SA 0.621 0.302 0.595 0.164 0.420 1.000 0.897 1.000 0.811 0.927 0.673
HA 0.459 0.133 0.250 0.183 0.256 1.000 0.800 0.800 0.600 0.800 0.528
r 0.739 0.442 0.421 1.121 0.680 1.000 0.892 0.800 0.740 0.858 0.769
(a) HR@10 Slightly-active Users (b) HR@10 Highly-active Users
Figure 1: Heat-map of Correlation Coefficient (ρ) of different mea-
sures between CF models for small-size attacks: (a) HR@10 on
Slightly-active Users, (b) HR@10 on Highly-active Users.
support size of the user profile (i.e., the user profile is not rich
enough for the attacker to be able to mimic it in a crafted way).
In contrast, highly-active users are more immune to attack in ML-
1M with higher density, because their recommendations rely on
neighbors with (very) rich user profiles. Put it simply, the crafted
attacks need to use a large number of profiles to be able to alter
recommendation for the target user.
The insight on sparsity is an important indication that data
characteristics are playing a role in the effectiveness of attacks and
it motivates further research in this direction.
3.2 Fine-grained analysis of the impact of
attacks on user classes
The goal of this analysis is to study how different CF models
behave against the attacks: which ones have similar performance
and which ones have a different performance. This study resembles
previous work on shilling attacks on CF models. However, we take
into account the impact of attack on user classes in this study as
well.
Instead of individual CF models performances and attack types,
we compute the pairwise Pearson correlation between each pair
of analyzed CF models. Figure 1 indicates a strong correlation on
HR@10 between BPR-SLIM and Item-kNN (ρ = 0.960 in Figure 1a
and ρ = 0.993 in Figure 1b). We justify this value by the fact
that both CF models exploit the item-item similarity computation.
Looking at the correlation values for User-kNN in Figure 1, one can
observe a slightly lower correlation in the case of slightly-active-
users with respect to other models. We think that this phenomenon
comes from the fact that tested attack are based on user preferences
which gain good effect also with small-size attacks. For instance,
HR@10 for Yelp on slightly-active users (0.750 and 0.850) is higher
than the mean values with other models for both attack (mean =
0.288 and 0.440). We can also observe an interesting behavior when
we compare ρ of BPR-MF with BPR-SLIM and Item-kNN. Figure 1
(a) and (b) show that HR@10 on both classes of attacked users
is highly correlated (ρ ≥ 0.840). Finally, results in Table 2 show
that BPR-MF is the model that is less influenced by user-classes
because the user-impact factor is close to 1 for each class of users
and attacks.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
This work investigates the effect of user-item attacks on classes
of users. Particularly, we investigated the effectiveness of attacks
from a global and local perspective by varying the quality and quan-
tity of attacks, the target user class and the collaborative filtering
recommendation model.
Experimental results on Yelp and MovieLens datasets indicate
that for Yelp dataset slightly-active users are more immune to
shilling attacks than highly-active users, a characteristic that is in
contrast with the results on MovieLens dataset where highly-active
users are more immune than slightly-active users. As datasets have
a very different sparsity (Yelp is approximately 40 time more sparse
than MovieLens) we will move our future works in analyzing the
effectiveness of dataset properties under different attack scenarios.
From a local perspective, we evidence that BPR-MF is less influ-
enced than other models when varying user-class and attack types.
On the other hand, BPR-SLIM and Item-kNN have shown similar
behavior related to the effect of attacks on user classes. In future,
we also plan to extend our study by considering more datasets from
different domains, exploring in an extensive way the influence of
dataset properties, such as sparsity, user and item skewness, rating
variance, on the effectiveness of different type of attacks. Also, it
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is of our interest to consider the impact of various shilling attack
types on CF models using item content as side information [9, 10].
These studies give important insights on the impact of shilling
attacks on recommender systems and provide clues on how to
reduce their effectiveness by working on datasets characteristics.
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